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Non-deterministic video frame sampling to thwart frame insertion attacks
ABSTRACT
Accurate machine understanding of videos is important, e.g., to maintain the integrity
and policy compliance of videos at a video hosting website. For example, a video-hosting
website with a policy of hosting only family-friendly videos deploys video understanding
systems to automatically exclude non-compliant videos. Techniques of image analysis are
applied to individual video frames to understand the video. Due to the computational cost of
processing individual frames, videos are sampled, e.g., at a rate of one frame per second, and
only the sampled frames are subjected to image analysis.
Sampling-based video understanding is susceptible to attack. For example, such systems
fail to detect a non-compliant video, if the video includes policy-compliant frames inserted to
match sampling instants. This disclosure utilizes randomization of sampling instants to thwart
frame insertion attacks that attempt to mask actual video content. Randomized sampling for
video understanding also assures reproducibility such that the understanding of the video is
independent of the sampling instants.
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Machine perception technologies, e.g., deep neural nets, are used to automatically
understand unstructured data such as images. Extending machine perception to video, frames of
a video are analyzed to understand the entire video. However, neural-net inference is
computationally expensive. Hence video is sub-sampled, e.g., at one frame per second, and
inference is run only on the sampled frames to understand the video.
Attacks have been developed that can fool sampling-based video-understanding
systems, e.g., where the inference from the sampled frames does not match the actual content of
the video. An example attack is to determine sampling instants, e.g., by trial-and-error, and to
replace sampled video frames with other images. Such an attack could deceive spam and abuse
systems that leverage video content signals. For example, if the inserted images that are
sampled comply with spam/ abuse standards, a neural-net can conclude that the video meets the
standards, even when the video retains spam/ abusive content. In another example, such an
attack can promote videos unfairly, e.g., by injecting popular entities into irrelevant videos and
click-baiting users, or by fooling discovery systems into promoting irrelevant videos.
Robustness to sampling attacks is important for automatic video understanding
technologies. Further, another desirable property for such technologies is reproducibility, e.g.,
the understanding of video content should be independent of sampling instants.
DESCRIPTION
Techniques of this disclosure thwart the sampling attack by randomizing the sampling
instant. A video sampled at some nominal sampling rate, e.g., one frame per second, is not
sampled exactly at each integral second. Rather, the video is sampled at a pseudo-random time
instant within an interval around the nominal sampling instants. For example, the sampling
instant may be within ±25% of the period around the nominal sampling instants.
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Fig. 1: Randomized sampling instants to thwart sampling attack

Fig. 1 illustrates the randomization of sampling instants per techniques of this
disclosure. Time-points marked at integral multiples of dt, e.g., 0, dt, 2dt, ..., represent the
nominal sampling instants. For example, dt=1 represents a nominal sampling rate of one frame
per second. The grey regions (102) around each nominal sampling instant represent the times
within which actual sampling of frames takes place. The width of the grey region is represented
as 2∆. For example, if ∆=0.25 seconds, actual sampling is performed within ±0.25 seconds of
the nominal sampling instant. The initial sampling instant, shown as zero time in Fig. 1, is itself
pseudo-randomly selected as an instant between the start of the video and dt seconds into the
video. The time-line of Fig. 1 is drawn with reference to the pseudo-randomly selected initial
sampling instant.
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Fig. 2: Pseudocode for randomized frame sampling

Fig. 2 illustrates pseudocode for randomized frame sampling of a video, per techniques
of this disclosure. V is a video file containing video frames v0, v1, ..., vn-1 with presentation
timestamps t0, t1, ..., tn-1, respectively. A sub-sampling of V is sought at a positive frame rate T,
and a new video W is obtained using the sub-sampled frames.
First, the frame rate T is set (202). The interval between samples is established as the
reciprocal of the frame rate (204). A randomizer is seeded with a seed that is unique for the
video. The seed is derived from video content or metadata, e.g., an identifier for the video
(206). The selection of the seed is such that a malicious user would find it computationally
prohibitive to establish a map between sampled frames and the video or metadata. The selection
of the seed is derived such that it is difficult for an uploader of a video to specify it or otherwise
manipulate its setting. The seed can be based on one or more of the following: video content
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bytes, metadata such as a video identifier assigned by a video hosting service, one or more user
identifiers, video header block, video length, resolution, etc. The seed is uniquely associated
with the video after sanitization, e.g., after stripping metadata that can be manipulated by a user.
The distribution generated by the randomizer is uniform between 0 and 1.
An initial sampling instant, desired_t, is pseudo-randomly and uniformly selected
between 0 and dt (208). An initial video frame v is selected from those video frames vx (0≤ x≤
n-1) whose timestamp is closest to desired_t (210). The initial video frame v is appended to a
set sampled_video_frames (212). A loop runs through the sequence of video frames selecting
sampling instants desired_t and video frames v that are within a ∆ of successive nominal
sampling instants (214).
In Fig. 2, ∆ is, for example, 25% of dt, such that the next sampling instant is a uniform
random instant between 3dt/4 and 5dt/4. The loop exits (illustrated with a break statement) if
the number of frames in the video is exhausted, e.g., if desired_t equals or exceeds the length of
the video. A new video W comprising the sampled video frames is obtained (216).
The performance of the pseudo-random sampling based video-understanding system, as
described herein, is not different from a video-understanding system that uses fixed sampling
instants. This is demonstrated by comparing the precision-versus-recall curves of videounderstanding systems based on fixed sampling and pseudo-random sampling instants.
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Fig. 3: Precision versus recall for video-understanding systems based on fixed sampling versus
pseudo-random sampling

Fig. 3 shows the precision-versus-recall performance of a video-understanding system
based on pseudo-random sampling (blue) and fixed sampling (red). It is evident that there is no
performance difference attributable to pseudo-random sampling of video frames.
As an alternate to the system described herein, frame sampling can also be randomized
by pseudo-randomly selecting a sampling instant and keeping it fixed for blocks of several
frame-lengths, then pseudo-randomly changing it for a next block of several frame-lengths, and
so on. Further, sampling rates can be changed between blocks.
CONCLUSION
Techniques of this disclosure counter frame-sampling prediction by adversaries by
deploying a robust sampling scheme for video understanding. The described sampling scheme
pseudo-randomly samples a video while maintaining adequate time-intervals between sampled
frames. Adversaries that attempt to mislead video understanding systems, e.g., to bypass policy
guidelines of a hosting website, by deliberate insertion of frames are thwarted.
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